In response to changing security environments after the Cold War, the U.S. has initiated Global Posture Review(GPR) of which main objective was to improve strategic flexibility of its forces abroad based on redefined alliance politics. Among the components of GPR, Forward Operating Sites(FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations(CSL), also known as ‘Lily pads’, are expected to play the most important role in improving flexibility and agility of forward deployed forces. In the ongoing War on Terror, the U.S. has negotiated with countries in Middle East, Central East, Black Sea, and Africa to gain access to foreign bases that would be used as Lily pads.
Against this backdrop, this paper addresses strategic challenges that GPR has faced by analyzing the case of U.S. withdrawal from K2 base in Uzbekistan 2005. First, the expansion of small and flexible foreign bases does not guarantee basing rights because of the trade-off between flexibility and stable access to foreign bases. Second, while the U.S. aims to create a global network of operational points, negotiation with undemocratic and at times even despotic leaders is inevitable. As a result, the U.S. may have to not only compromise its core principle of foreign policy, which is the promotion of democratic rules, but also risk putting extra cost in negotiating for an alternative base. Third, while the level of strategic distrust between the U.S. and China has become increasingly corrosive, Beijing might be more bend towards upgrading its A2/AD capability if Beijing takes the expansion of small and flexible bases of the U.S. around the areas of its core interests as an attempt to encircle China. If that is the case, the U.S. efforts to act preemptively against potential threats could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, unwantedly creating a situation in which threats get more intensified.