This paper aims to provide an understanding of Robert Pfaller’s concept of interpassivity by outlining its definition, operational mechanisms, and the particular form of pleasure it entails. Interpassive behavior refers to the act of delegating one’s enjoyment to another medium, thereby avoiding direct engagement with the object of desire. To achieve this, the interpassive subject employs substitution, presenting two qualitatively different acts as if they were the same. Since the subject does not believe in the efficacy of the substitution, another entity must do so in their place, and this role is played by an anonymous Other. In most cases, this Other is an imaginary being who judges the substituted relation based on outward appearances. The subject’s motivation for such behavior lies in ambivalent desires toward the object, and interpassivity serves as a compromise formation. Interpassive acts show structural affinities with magical thinking, in that they attempt wish-fulfillment through symbolic substitution, and with obsessive neurosis, in that the act of substitution emerges as a consequence of inner conflict. The subject obtains pleasure by causing the Other to believe in the illusion produced by its own act of substitution. In most cases, this pleasure remains hidden from the subject itself. Yet there are instances in which the subject consciously adopts an interpassive stance, deriving enjoyment even while recognizing the fictitious nature of the act.