2012, Vol., No.84

Response of the Left Gyeongsang Province of Joseon Troop in the Early Phase of the Japanese Invasion, 1592

Jinsoo Kim | 2012, (84) | pp.1~27 | number of Cited : 24

PDF

JapaneseInvasion ofKorea in 1592,asa partofa largeinternational war,hadsuch agreatrippleeffectthatitbroughtvariouschangesin all areas of society and politics of the East Asian region. Factors that contributed to overcoming the war were the activities ofJoseon's naval forcesand arighteousarmy,leadership ofthegeneralsandadmiralsand others.Aboveall,activitiesoftherighteousarmywerehighlyregardedand recognizedasamajorfactorofovercomingthewareven today.In regard to riposteofleftGyeongsang provinceatthebeginning ofthewar,prior studiesdealtwith itsuperficially,thegovernmentTroopsnearly collapsed and righteous army took the initiative.However,taking a closerlook at theinsidefacts,wefind outthatdespitecollapseofa lineofcommand duetoJapaneselargeinvasion,notafew ofthegovernmentcommanders ofleftGyeongsangprovincedefendedthefortsin theirassignedarea.Also,in areas which localgovernmentofficers left,in place ofthem,scholar groups or former officers in the region raised up forces by gathering scattered soldiers and fought against the Japanese, taking their own militaryactions. Afterward,as CommanderPark jin ofleftGyeongsang province troops took Andongjin as a military base, Joseon army of left Gyeongsang province began to establish a line ofmilitary command in earnestand rebuilta military force.Itwas possible because there were activities of Gwon eung-su, who commanded the government Troops and righteous army in Gyeongju and Daegu, repulsing the Japanese army and intercepting its attack. As a result, Joseon army of left Gyeongsang province'sfightingaspectchanged from defenseoflocalmilitarybaseinto anoverallandanorganizedcounterattacklikerecapturingatown fortand conducting surprises attack on the Japanese troops. In addition,Yeongcheon fortandGyeongjufort,which werein strategiclocations,were recapturedandthesituationofthewarturnedinfavoroftheJoseon.

A studyonKoreans’hostileview ofJapanduringthe JoseonPeriod -WiththefocusontheperiodbetweentheJapaneseinvasioninthe late16thcenturyandtheendoftheJoseonPeriod-

KyubaeLee | 2012, (84) | pp.29~57 | number of Cited : 3

PDF

Variousstudieshavebeen madeofKoreans’view ofJapan during the JoseonPeriod.However,thenumberofsuchstudiespalesincomparisonto thenumberofstudiesofJapanesepeople’sview ofKorea;and,notably,thenumberofstudiesfocusingon Koreans’hostileview ofJapan iseven smaller. Korean hostility towards Japan has long been regarded as a natural and ‘objective’ fact, but few studies examining the concrete backgroundtosuchhostilityexist. This study attempts to shed lighton the reality ofKorean hostility towardsJapan aftertheJapaneseinvasion ofKorea(1592-1598)duringthe Joseon Period, which remains relatively unexplored. There was some consistency in Koreans’view ofJapan,particularly with regard to their hostility,duringtheJoseon Period.From the17th centuryon,theKoreans regarded theJapaneseasenemy,contrastingsomewhatwith theirview of Japan in the preceding period, which was characterized by feelings of contempttowards such ‘barbarians’.The newly formed hostility towards Japan wascloselylinkedtothecollectivememoryofJapaneseinvasion at theendofthe16thcentury.Thismaybedescribedin thefollowingterms:“The memory of the Japanese invasion in the late 16th century” =“Hostility toward Japan”= “The collective view ofJapan as an enemy.”Such amindsetwasevidenteven amonglatergenerationsofKoreans.The hostilityfelttowardsJapan,which formed in thewakeoftheseven-year warin thelate16th century,persistedin themindsofmostKoreansuntil theearly20thcentury,whenJapanannexedKoreaasacolony. Atthatpoint,thescarcelyforgettablememoryofJapan’sinvasion inthe 16th centuryhadbeen inseparablylinked toKoreans’deep-seated hostility towardstheJapaneseformorethan threecenturies.AsChoeIk-hyeon(崔益鉉),who led a voluntary militia againstJapanese colonistsin thelate 19th century,putitresolutely,Koreansregarded theJapaneseas“enemy barbarians”and as people with whom Koreans “could notbear to live under the same sky.” In this sense, the impact which the Japanese invasion inthelate16th centuryhadontheKorean peoplethroughoutthe restoftheJoseonperiodcanbesaidtohavebeendecisive

A studyontheProcessofJoseonandJapanResumingTheir DiplomaticRelationshipsafterJapan'sInvasionofJoseonin1592

Bang ki cheol | 2012, (84) | pp.59~84 | number of Cited : 7

PDF

Almostrightafter Japan's Invasion ofJoseon in 1592 ended, Japan requested the resumption of diplomatic relationships between the two countries,buttheanti-Japanesesentimentamong theJoseon peoplewas toostrongtoallow theresumption. Tokugawa Ieyasu asked Joseon to resume its diplomatic relationships with Japan through theTsushima Island aftertheSekigahara battle,but Joseon refused his request. Then Tsushima demanded reconciliation,proposingthereturn ofcaptivesandspreadingarumoraboutre-invasion. Joseon wasnotabletoeasilytakeaposition becauseitcouldnotclearly determinewhetherthere-invasion rumorwastrueandtherequestforthe resumption ofdiplomaticrelationshipsbetween thetwocountrieswasthe intention ofIeyasu.However,itended up dispatching Yu Jeong(惟政)as Tamjeoksa(探賊使)toTsushimain 1604,givingin toitsrepeatedrequests. Yu Jeongmetwith Ieyasu in Edoandagreedon therestoration principles ofdiplomaticrelationshipsbetween thetwo countries,butIeyasu did not send the credentials and accordingly prevented the formal diplomatic relationshipsfrom beingformedbetweenthetwocountries. Afterthat,Tsushimacontinuedtomakerequestsforresumingdiplomatic relationships between the two countries. Joseon asked for Ieyasu's credentials and subpoena on the robbers of Seonreung(宣陵) and Jeongreung(靖陵),finally its requests were metby Japan.Even though therewas doubtson the authenticity ofthecredentialsand therobbers,Joseon restored its diplomatic relationships with Japan by dispatching Hoidapgyeomsoehwansa(回答兼刷還使)in1607. JoseondecidedtoresumeitsdiplomaticrelationshipswithJapanbecause ithad to focus on the defense on its northern borderwith the growing Jurchen stateaswellaspost-warrestoration efforts.In addition,Joseon peoplegrew favorabletoJapan,especially Ieyasu,which played a critical rolein theresumption.KingSeonjo(宣祖)regarded Japan asan equalof Joseon unlike his perception before the war and exhibited a friendly attitude to Ieyasu.The envoys ofJoseon dispatched to Japan were also friendly to Ieyasu and his son Tokugawa Hidetada, and Ieyasu and Hidetadatreatedthem well,too. TheinternationalorderwaschangingaroundMingDynastyafterJapan's invasion ofJoseon in 1592.In China,MingDynastywasbeingreplacedby Qing Dynasty.In Japan,the ToyotomiHideyoshifeudalgovernmentwas replaced by theIeyasu feudalgovernment.In thosechanginginternational situations,Joseon needed a differentdiplomatic ideology from before the warin ordertomakeactiveresponsestothem andthustreatedJapan in amoreequalpositionthanbeforethewar.

TheChangesofCentralArmySystem aftertheJapanese Invasionof1592

Kim Jong Soo | 2012, (84) | pp.85~115 | number of Cited : 5

PDF

ThegovernmentofJoseon Dynastytransformedthecentralarmysystem in threerespects.First,ittransformed theway tocontrolthesoldiers.It abolished the personalcontrolsystem which was made in the period of militaryregimeofGoryeoDynastyand introduced a publiccontrolsystem in 1400.Butthere was a serious shortcoming in this system.While the generalscould command soldiersallotted to them in theory,they did not haveanysoldiersin fact.Becausethesoldierswereconsistedofpeasants who worked in their fields in peacetime.To overcome this shortcoming Hunryondogam(訓鍊都監)introducedtheprivatecontrolsystem in1593. Second,thegovernmentofJoseon Dynastyabolishedtherotation system of soldiers.KingTaejong(太宗)introducedtherotationsystem ofGabsa(甲士)topreventanypersonalrelationship between generalsandGabsa.But military abilities ofGabsa fellseverely and the rotations were not kept correctly.King Seonjo(宣祖) said in a sharp regretthatGabsa were not soldiersbutpeasants.ThereforeHunryondogam which wasfounded in the JapaneseInvasionof1592wasconsistedofstandingarmies. Third,ThegovernmentofJoseonDynastytransformedthemainforcesof armies from cavalrysoldierstoinfantrysoldiers.Becausecavalrysoldiers whoshouldtaketheirturnsfrom distantregionstriedtoevadetheirduties in early period ofJoseon Dynasty.Thedecreasein thenumberofhorses which wasmadeworsein thedevelopmentofagricultureafter16century and the sharp rise ofprice ofthe horse made theircarrying outtheir dutiesmoredifficult.MoreoverthegovernmentofJoseon Dynasty learned the superiority ofmatchlock during the Japanese Invasion of1592.The armies ofJoseon Dynasty whose main forces were cavalry soldiers were defeatedbytheJapanesearmieswhichusedmatchlock.Sothegovernment ofJoseon Dynasty tried totrain soldierstouseguns.Theintroduction of matchlockinfluencedgreatlythemilitaryindustryofJoseonDynasty.

The Cultural Exchange of Joseon(朝鮮), Ming(明) Dynasty and Japan by the Japanese Invasion in 1592(壬辰倭亂)

Jaegwang Park | 2012, (84) | pp.117~147 | number of Cited : 4

PDF

Qījì Guāng's Yuānyāngzhèn in the later Míng Dynasty and the principle of the Bǎizhèn

Hong, Eul-Pyo | 2012, (84) | pp.149~192 | number of Cited : 4

PDF

The Organization and Finance of Chungcheong Byeongyeong in the Late Joseon Dynasty

Yu Dong Ho | 2012, (84) | pp.193~229 | number of Cited : 5

PDF

The Comparative Study on the tactics of pre-modern Japan and Korea in 16~17th Century

Roh Young-Koo | 2012, (84) | pp.231~268 | number of Cited : 9

PDF

The Organization and Management of Palace Armies in Early Tang China

Chung, Soon Mo | 2012, (84) | pp.269~295 | number of Cited : 3

PDF

Thesouthernpalacearmywasfordefendingthecapitalcity,aprincipal axisofthepalacearmy,which wasbasically managed byFubing system in early Tang China.The peasants who had to serve in the southern palace army by rotation, felt honoured to be the palace soldiers, the burdentheytookwasveryheavythough. But after Gaozong, due to Koguryo expedition, the peasant soldiers'burden went beyond their abilities, therefore, the number of runaway soldiersincreased.Itwasan inevitableresultofTang dynasty tochange its way of recruit. It adopted the mercenary soldiers. That Zhangyue organized the southern palace army with Guoqisymbolized the end of Fubing system.Itwas very obvious thathiring soldiers was againstthe Tang'sofficialrecruitingway,theFubingsystem. Anotheraxisofthepalacearmy,thenorthen palacearmy,wasstarted with theoriginalpalacearmy.Theoriginalpalacearmywasacorearmed forceofGaozu,thefounderofTangdynasty.Theoriginalpalacearmywas veryclosely related totheroyalfamily,itwasnotsurprisingthatitwas notmanaged byTang'sofficialrecruitingsystem.Therefore,Tangdynasty constantly tried to organized the northern palace army underthe Tang's officialrecruitingsystem.On theotherhand,Tangdynastytriedtoreduce theratioofthemercenary. However, Li Shimin(Taizong) who took the power though the Xuanwumencoup,didn'torganizethem undertheCode.Itmustbecaused bythehisfearoflosingthethrone.Thereafter,thenorthern palacearmy had an absoluteinfluenceupon thesuccession ofthethrone.Thepalace armymighthavegiven theroyalfamilyasenseofsecurity,butthatroyal privatearmywasmanagedbyhiringsoldiers,thatwasfarfrom theTang's officialmilitarysystem. DuringtheWuzetian period,theestablishmentofYulin forcesovercame the royalprivate characteristics in the palace army, butironically the southern palacearmycouldnotbemanaged byFubingsystem anymore. And thenorthern palacearmywaschanged intolegalarmybuttheyhad torecruitsoldiersbyhiring. Ironically, Tang's two palace armies were managed by contradicting ways.Wecould find contradicting factorsin themanagementofsouthern palacearmyandnorthernpalacearmy.

A studyontheDevelopmentProcessofKoreanMilitary ServiceSystem

나태종 | 2012, (84) | pp.297~322 | number of Cited : 5

PDF

KJCKorea
Journal Central

military history 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.94

2012, Vol., No.84