2014, Vol., No.115

A study on the lineage of Isabu and his political position

Jeon Deogjae | 2014, (115) | pp.1~48 | number of Cited : 14

The Understanding on the Border and Territory of Northeast Goryeo by Colonial Historians during Japanese Occupation Period

Kwon Young-Kook | 2014, (115) | pp.49~96 | number of Cited : 9

The research on the border and territory of Joseon was started by Japanese researchers in Japanese occupation period. Joseon was once highly interested in northern border of Goryeo when Joseon was in conflict with Yeojin with the development of 4 Guns and 6 Jins in the early Joseon Dynasty. Late Joseon Silhak scholars were also interested in the border and territory of Goryeo and supposed that the locations of 9 Castles are below South of Gilju by raising questions that ‘History of Goryeo’ does not match with the records of biographies of influential persons, especially the locations of Gongheomjin and Seonchunryeong. After annexation of Joseon, Japan was interested in the Border of Joseon facing Border issues against Manchuria. It was important purpose of research to discover the fact that the border between Joseon and Manchuria has no great significance when viewed from the Manchuria-Joseon perspective as it could be an obstacle to unite the two regions. The border and territory of Northeast Goryeo by colonial historians during Japanese occupation are as follows. In unified Silla, Deungju(登州-安邊) was the north border against Yeojin, however, he border was expanded up to Hwaju (Yeongheung) by evelopment in Northeast region since the foundation of Goryeo, then in 7th year of Jeongjong, Hwaju became the negotiation window with Yeojin. After gates and castles were built in Jeongju, Gwanju and Wonheungjin in the 7th year of Jeongjong, the north border was expanded up to Jeongju. There was a lot of controversy surrounding the locations of 9 castles especially Gongheomjin and Seonchunryeong, the North end border in accordance with the conquest of Yeojin and building 9 castles by Yun, Gwan in Yejong. Scholars tried to disclose historical facts and geographical locations on the basis of thorough historic research and field survey. Each researcher presented a different view regarding the locations of 9 castles as Tsuda Sokichi(津田左右吉) assumed South of Gilju, Ikeuchi Hiroshi(池內宏) the Hamheung Plain and Matsui Hitoshi(松井等) South of Duman River. Many Korean scholars have recently published thru field survey in Manchuria insisting that the castles were located in Manchu region, North of Duman River. As the castles were under the control of Yüan by Ssangsungchongkwanbu(雙城摠管府) established in Northeast region in Yüan intervention period thus the competent range of 2 Castles-Administration was the subject for the research of the border and territory of Goryeo in this period. The early jurisdiction of 2 Castles-Administration was between South Jeongju and North Deungju, but reduced to South Jeongju and North Hwaju with Home Castles in 24th year of King Chungryeol. The north border, mostly Gilju, of newly acquired territory was the research subject in Northeast region after the recovery of 2 Castles-Administration. So far, there seems no big difference between researches byJapanese researchers in Japanese occupation period and today’s Korean scholars on the subject of Border and Territory of Northeast Goryeo except for the locations of 9 castles and Gongheomjin, acknowledged to have been built in the northernmost area by Yun, Gwan. Japanese researchers have been suspected to have deliberately reduced the locations of 9 castles from the colonial view of history. But they closely examined and tried to ascertain the locations of castles by directly exploring the old castle sites in Hamheung with the relevant historical data available in those days. And each different view was presented as South of Gilju by Tsuda Sokichi(津田左右吉), the Hamheung Plain by Ikeuchi Hiroshi(池內宏) and South of Duman River by Matsui Hitoshi(松井等), which seems they didn’t try to reduce the territory or distort on purpose based on the colonial view as Joseon was already part of Japan after the annexation.

The Territory and Territorial Waters of Goryeo:by Colonial Historians during Japanese Occupation Period- Including Donghea and Dok-do -

DAESIK KIM | 2014, (115) | pp.97~156 | number of Cited : 3

Though it is different from modern concept, ‘territorial waters’ have been employed since Goryeo that sea itself is understood as part of territory. Goryeo sought to establish a new relationship with neighboring countries after unifying post Three Kingdoms and reorganized relevant systems prior to setting relationship with Japan. Goryeo established ‘Southeast Sea and Islands Division’ in 22nd year of Taejo(939) immediately after the unification of post Three Kingdoms. Southeast Sea and Islands Division was established for military purpose to beat Japanese raiders and Yeojin pirates appearing in East Coast as well as diplomatic objective responsible for the exchange and trade with Japan. In 23rd year of Gwangjong(972), Governor of Namwon, Ham, Geunggil and Govenor of Gimhae, Lee, Sundal visited Daema-do to deliver the National Documents, Daema-do quickly transferred the Documents to Dazaifu(Local Government). Japanese government ordered Dazaifu to quickly forward the respond. Cargo ambassador and trade ambassador dispatched in 25th year of Gwangjong(974) were sent to the capital. There were no such prompt reports and immediate treatments. This is regarded in return for the military action by Taejo of Goryeo. Goryeo forwarded 3 Official Documents to Japan, Daemadosa and Daemado in 16th year of Seongjong(997), but Japan decided to return the Documents due to disrespectful language similar to Documents of Song. Goryeo kept control of East Sea and South Sea. For example, when Doijeok attacked Japanese coast in 1019, the pitched battle between Goryeo and Georan for 2 months ended by complete victory of Goryeo which started by attack of So, Baeap leading 100,000 army in December, 9th year of Hyeonjong(1018) up to Guiju Victory the beginning of following February. Doijeok, a sort of Northeast Yeojin attacked coast of Goryeo and Kyushu, Japan while Goryeo suffered a great war. Goryeo had no big injuries or damages equipped with military power such as Southeast Sea and Islands Division, however, Kaneda castle, Daemado(對馬島金田城) and Itto castle, Iki(壹岐怡土城) of Japan were captured and Gi-i castle, Chikuzenguk(筑前國基肄城) in Kyushu was invaded. Goryeo governed East Sea and East Coast as part of territory and beaten pirates and rebellions whenever they showed up. East Sea, Ulleung-do and Dok-do were territorial waters and territory for Goryeo to protect. The Joseon History by Hayashi, Daisuke(林泰輔, 1854-1922), modern Korean History acknowledged by Japanese, mentioned an important fact regarding East Sea and Sea of Japan at that time. Hayashi used the words of West Sea and South Sea in Geography section of General Remarks indicating that ‘There is no big difference between tides in West Sea and South Sea.’ Further he wrote that ‘The tide difference is only 2～3 ships up to East Sea of Hamgyeong-do and Gangwon-do, north of Ulsan-hyeon.’ Thus Hayashi wrote the most basic and general information that the sea from Ulsan up to Hamgyeong-do is called ‘East Sea’ at that time, too. Japanese accordingly recognized that East Sea is the Sea of Korea. Hayashi also wrote ‘Sea of Japan’ indicating the Straits of Korea instead of Black Border or Black Sea generally referred to in Japan those days. He just reduced the abbreviation of Japan’s adjacent sea(日本邊海). Then after Japan invaded Joseon, they started calling East Sea as Sea of Japan. Therefore the change of perception has a thread of connection with Japan’s expansionism and has close relationship with invasion, colonization and the control policy of Korea. Decisive occasions were Kanghwa Treaty in 1876, First Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and Russo-Japanese War in 1904.

Selective Analysis on the History of the Koryo Dynasty in the New Korean History Textbooks Released in March 2014

LEE Miji , Oh, Chi-Hoon | 2014, (115) | pp.157~218 | number of Cited : 7

A Consideration of Naong’s Buddhification

Jungseop Youm | 2014, (115) | pp.219~256 | number of Cited : 9

Naong(懶翁) is the monk who was picked up by King Gongmin(恭愍王) after the downfall of Sindon(辛旽) in the late age of Goryeo and became the actual leader of Buddhism. But, during the political change that King Gongmin was assassinated and King Woo(禑王) was enthroned, he suddenly passed away in the Sinneugsa Temple(神勒寺). After then, in Joseon Dynasty, he became to be extremely venerated as “the incarnation of Buddha”. There have been no such cases in Korean Buddhist history. This paper is to consider the process of Naong’s Buddhification. For this, Chapter I deals with the living-Buddha culture that had existed in Goryeo even before Naong through the cases of Cheolsan(鐵山) and Jogong(指空). With this, we can see that Naong’s Buddhification was not a sudden change but a result of precedent tendency in the cultural background. And, as we know, Naong was sanctified after his death rather than during his life time. Therefore, though Naong’s Buddhification is based on the living-Buddha culture, there are strict differences between the two. Chapter Ⅱ deals with how Naong came to be Buddhified by Naong’s disciples based on the recognitive change about Naong through the production of many sariras and miracles in the cremation of Naong’s body. Naong’s Buddhification was promoted by his disciples who had felt the sense of crisis during the political change after Naong’s death and asked for the religious pivot point. Later, the persecution toward Naong was relieved by another change in the political power system, and the affection for Naong expanded to the whole nation, accelerating his sanctification. It resulted in Naong’s ‘Incarnation Theory of Shakyamuni’ during Joseon Dynasty. With this research, we can see more clearly about the role of Naong’s disciples and his status in the late Goryeo and the early Joseon Ages. It may have a great significance in understanding the Buddhism during the late Goryeo and the early Joseon.

Establishment of the Ruling Order in Early Joseon in Terms of Judgments in Revenge Cases

Son, Kyun Ick | 2014, (115) | pp.257~296 | number of Cited : 7

The first aim of this paper is to analyze judgments of politicians in early Joseon regarding the personal revenge cases. Secondly, based on the analysis, this paper will reveal solutions of the politicians for the discrepancy between ethical standards and legal requirements in Confucius society. In Confucius society, judgments on personal revenge cases often raised controversial issues among politicians due to the conflict between Confucius scriptures and practical laws; the former allows personal revenge whereas the latter forbids it. Given that Joseon is a Confucius nation, politicians in Joseon were not free from the dilemma as well. Politicians in early Joseon introduced provisions regarding personal revenge cases in the Great Ming Code without any revision. Since only a few types of personal revenge, which are practically impossible to be realized, are permitted. In process of judgments, the politicians characterized the personal revenge as a problematic behavior that not only bears possibility of killing innocents but also threatens the sovereign’s power to life and death. Furthermore, they presumed that an individual’s moral deeds in accordance with Confucius codes could be suppressed once such deeds undermine public welfare. It is worth to note that discussions above do not exhaustively exclude the Confucius approach. The politicians forbids the personal revenge not due to its moral aspect but because of its methodological problem. In order to provide a fundamental solution of the aforementioned discrepancy, the politicians defined the legal action by bereaved family as a form of legal revenge that satisfies not only Confucius codes but also those of lawful. They stressed the moral aspect of the legal action, and even gave a prizes to the accuser and awarded them; in effect, they were trying to make the personal revenge to be realized within the lawful-boundaries by solely allowing the revenge-by-legal-action. In early Joseon, there were conflicts between the obligation of a bereaved family to revenge and the obligation of obedience to a person in the hierarchical social relationship. There have been cases that owners killed slaves and the bereaved families attempted to kill the owners or accused them. The politicians sentenced death to the bereaved family who has killed their owner to revenge and heavily punished one who has accused the owner. This shows that the politicians put priority in the hierarchical social relationship over the blood relationship. On the contrary, the politicians only allowed people’s legal action to a local governor who have murdered, either by personally or by giving a excessive punishment, one’s family. This was a exceptional privilege given that no other form of legal action was allowed. Such a position was reflected in the enactment of the criminal laws of Joseon.

A history of Wolsongpojin

Hodong Kim | 2014, (115) | pp.297~334 | number of Cited : 4

According to 『the Sinjeung Donggukyeojiseungnam』(the Newly Revised Geography of Choson) book 45th, Gangwondo Pyeonghaehyun Guanbangjo, Wolsongpojin or Wolsongmanhojin which was naval barracks of Chosun, “was located 7 lee(2.75km) in the east of town” and “had one Soogoonmanho(navy general)” The ruins remains around Gyeongsangbukdo Uljingun Pyeonghaeeup Wolsongri 303-17. Wolsongpojin Stone Fortress, constructed in the 1555(Myungjong 10th year) kept the walls until the 1970s, lost most parts of the walls with the rebuilding of the region. According to 『the Uljingunjy』(the History of Uljingun), Soogoonmanho was assigned to Uljinpo and Wolsongpo by the establishment of Jinguan System of Sejo(1466, 12th year), but there was a record that Soogoonmanho was already in Wolsongpo before 1427(Sejong 9th year). According to 『the Sejongsillok(the Part of King Sejong in the Annals of the Choson Dynasty)』『Girijy』(Geography of Choson), as a fortress to defend coastal waters of Gangwon-do, Wolsongpo had one navy vessel and 70 navy men with one Soogoonmanho to command them. Compared with other fortress of Soogoonmanho, Wolsongpo had the lowest number of navy vessel and men. Wolsongpo’s geographic characteristics with strong currents and sands hindering the approach to a bay made it with less vessel and men. There was a record of late Chosun that Samchukpo and Wolsongpo had no navy vessel and men. In spite of the claim of its abolition of Manho in Wolsongporyung during Hyojong’s rule, which meant the reduction of function of Yosesoohochu, Wolsongmanho had played an important role as a member of Ulleungdo’s Sootosa to maintain its function since Sookjong’s rule. Yong-bok Ahn‘s incident made it a rule for Samchukyoungjang and Wolsongmanho alternately to implement ‘Sooto(Find and Seek) Policy’ on Ulleungdo once per two to three years. Therefore, according to 『the Sejongsillok』『Girijy』, there were 70 shooters in Wolsongpo, according to 『the Illsunglok』(1784)(Jungjo 8th year), Wolsongmanho had 4 hundreds of soldiers. In the record of May 10th 1784, Jungjo 10th year of 『the Illsunglok』, though it was a rule to dispatch Sootosa three times at due year, it started when the wind started to calm down, and it stopped when the wind was high. Therefore it was possible to dispatch Sootosa only for the period of 6 months around the year, and three times for 6 months. So it is probably that Sootosa was dispatched 3 times at due year. Except for this material, there were materials suggesting only that Sootosa were dispatched to Ulleungdo late April to May. With Sootosa’s round trip of Ulleungdo, on the map of 「Gangwon-do」 of 『Yeojido』 of the late 18th century, and 「Haejoajeondo」 of the Mid-19th century, were marked Uljin-Ulleungdo sea route. Sooto(Find and Seek) Policy implemented by Samchukyoungjang and Wolsongmanho alternately was abolished by the appointment of Seokgyu Jeon as a Jeonimdojang in Gojong 20th year(1883). Later, Given the importance of Ulleungdo seaway, Manho, Songjin Jo also served Ulleungdo-dojang in Gojong 25th year(1888),As Wolsongmanho held additional post of Ulleungdo-dojang, Manho usually entered Ulleungdo March and went out July or August. The abolition of Wolsongmanho’s additional post of Ulleungdo-chumsa shrinked the role of Wolsongmanho irrevocably.

Postwar Shanghai Korean Community’s Awareness of Collaboration for Japan during the War - With Focus on the Contributions in the Shanghai Korean Newspaper Daehan Ilbo -

Kim Kwang Jae | 2014, (115) | pp.335~380 | number of Cited : 4

The Liberation on August 15, 1945 was certainly dramatic to Korean community in Shanghai, but at the same time, it was very abrupt and embarrassing. After Yun Bong-gil’s patriotic deed at the Hongkou Park in 1932, the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai was chased by Japanese imperialism and left Shanghai, and most of the Koreans in Shanghai were under the control of Japanese power. Particularly, at the time of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the Pacific War in 1941, they were taken into, and mobilized for, “Korea and Japan Are One” and “Subjecting to Japan” movements, and after the Liberation, they could not be free from the criticism of their being collaborators of Japan. Right after the Liberation, in the Shanghai overseas Korean newspaper Daehan Ilbo, the outcry to punish the treachery was high. First, a person named “Underground” raised the settlement theory that “Hangan” i.e. Korean collaborators for Japan should be punished. As opposed to this, in another overseas Korean newspaper in Shanghai Korean community, Sinhan Ilbo, there appeared so-called tolerance theory that “intellectual benign policy” should be given to the collaborators for Japan. Against these settlement and tolerance controversies, a person named Nam Jeong-ho asserted a kind of “reality theory” that goes beyond the settlement theory and the tolerance theory. Considering various difficult situations that Shanghai Korean community faced, he emphasized that the livelihood protection of Shanghai overseas Koreans should take precedence over any further controversies about the punishment of the collaborators for JapanAfterwards, what became of the controversies? The controversies appear to have ended without continuing any further. Against the backdrop of the abrupt cessation of the controversies, there appears to have been arbitration and mediation of the Korean Provisional Government or the overseas Korean organizations. The key figures of the Korean Provisional Government who had come to Shanghai on November 5 were about to return home on November 23. It seems that the Korean Provisional Government also appears to have turned around to realistic position, realizing that it is not easy to punish Korean collaborators for Japan in Shanghai, a foreign territory, by continuing the controversies any further. They appear to have judged that it is more urgent to resolve the realistic problems of Shanghai overseas Koreans who lost their economic base and were in difficulties in a foreign land.

The elections of township-level People’s Committees of North Korea in 1947

JEON HYUN SOO | 2014, (115) | pp.381~422 | number of Cited : 5

The Understanding of United States on Korea-Japan Talk Based on Declassified documents of Diplomatic missions of the State Department

Jinhee Park | 2014, (115) | pp.423~462 | number of Cited : 9

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One of the most important documents in Korea-Japan Talk, the United States government document materials. This is because the relationship between Korea and Japan, there is a need to look at in the United States in Northeast Asia policy. Therefore, the United States talks about Korea and Japan have expressed interest. Each show was different about the current issues in the Korea-Japan Talk is recognized and the corresponding United States. The United States has expressed the official position for the Property Claims issue and peace line issue. Whereas the United States was not based on the Japan’s Property Claims. Also pointed out that peace line was in violation of the international law. Property Claims issue was directly related to the issue of how the past relationship between Korea and Japan should be viewed, perceived and evaluated. So it remained one of the most controversial topics for the duration of the negotiations between the two countries, and it served as a significant variable for the outcome of the talks. Korea sought for a new relationship with Japan to be established, a relationship based upon the Japan people's officially admitted regret and remorse regarding their deeds and actions committed in the past during the Japanese occupation period of Korea. But Japan perceived their past relationship with Korea and all their deeds to be justifiable ones, and they also thought that their influences upon Korea were not always negative but in fact most of the times positive. These differences in opinions, perceptions and positions led to fiery debates over the Property Claims issue, and also the incident of the so-called reckless remarks by Kubota. But the United States did not comment on the Kubota’s reckless remarksIssue of returning Korean residents inside Japan to North Korea was discussed and settled between Japan and the North Korean government, and such settlement became a major hurdle for the continuation of the Korea-Japan talks and not to mention the efforts to better the diplomatic relationship of those two countries. Japan had always tried to expel the Koreans inside Japan as soon as possible since their defeat in the war, and apparently the settlement was also part of those efforts. The Korean government strongly protested to Japan's expulsion of Korean people to North Korea, and the South Korean public held anti-Japanese demonstrations, trying to inform the rest of the world of Japan's actions. But in the end, Korea was not able to prevent Japan from continuing to expel Korean citizens to North Korea. Washington sought to support the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who prioritized the U. S.-Japan Alliance and sought to revise the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. The way to support Kishi, who was then facing enormous resistance from those who argued against the revision of the treaty, was to remain silent about the repatriation—something most Japanese agreed on across the ideological spectrum. Although it was wrapped in humanitarian rhetoric, no one cared about their human rights. That is the truth of repatriationAfter all, the factor that substantively determined the nature and shape of the Korean government's Japanese policy turned out to be the United States of America. U.S. also served as a prominent factor in the Japanese government's devising of their own policies regarding Korean matters. In other words, the Korea-Japan relationship cannot be appropriately addressed by discussing only these two countries. The Korea-U. S. relationship, the Japan-U.S. relationship and the triangular relationship among Korea, Japan and U. S. should all be considered at the same time.

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The Review of Korean History 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 1.02

2014, Vol., No.115