2012, Vol., No.83

A studyontheprocessofNKPA'sCombatTrainingUsingthe CombatManualfrom theSovietUnionbeforetheKoreanWar

Sungjin Jang | 2012, (83) | pp.1~33 | number of Cited : 5

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A studyontheBackgroundofGPB EstablishmentwithinNKPA -WithaFocusonNK-PRC ConflictduringKoreanWar-

Lee Sin Jae | 2012, (83) | pp.35~66 | number of Cited : 10

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North Korean People's Army(NKPA) is a party organization installed within the every level of the North Korean military, from Corps to company.North Korea established GeneralPolitics Bureau(GPB),a party organization,within the military on 21stOct,1950.North Korean regime announced thatthe reason forthe establishmentofa party organization within the military was that there was a need to strengthen military principles during the Korean War,when North Korean military was on retreat after entry of the UN forces. However, considering that North Korean leadership atthis time was notable to effectively communicate with otherbranchesofgovernmentandmilitary,whatwasthebackground fortheestablishmentofGPB?Werethereanyotherreason?This study focuses on the background for the establishmentofGPB,with a specialfocuson North Korea-PRC conflictduring thistimeperiod whichhadbeenpreviouslyneglectedinotherstudies. With the establishmentofNorth Korea-China Combined Command and the entry ofChinese People's Volunteer Army(CPVA), Kim IlSung lost operationalcontrolover NKPA as the Supreme Commander.In addition,entryofCPVA weakenedKim'spoliticalinfluenceinNorthKoreanPolitics. The main purpose ofthis study is to providea differentview on the establishmentofGPB: itwasestablishedbyKim IlSungasan effortto check on operational control which was handed over to the CPVA commander. AftertheestablishmentofGPB,themilitaryprinciplesoftheNKPA was strengthened.In addition,Kim continued to emphasize thatNorth Korea mustlead thewarand thatthewarmustbefoughtusing North Korean tactics. Since then, he began to be described as “the Sun" by the pamphlets published by GPB,and his politicalstatus was elevated over higher.Withhiselevatedpoliticalstatus,hewasabletotakeactiononhis politicalenemies,who werethemain supportersofNorth Korea -China Combined Command.He was now able to controlhis relations with the supportersofthecombinedcommand. In sum,Kim was able to check on Chinese influence overthe North Korean military by establishing GPB, a party organization, within the military.In addition,GPB helped Kim gain politicalupper hand within NorthKoreanregime.

WasItImpossiblefortheKoreanWartoBeCompletedEarlier? -TrialandBreakdownofthePeaceMediation-

Gye-Dong kim | 2012, (83) | pp.67~104 | number of Cited : 4

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A studyontheChangeoftheRoleofU.S.Tactical NuclearWeaponsintheKoreanPeninsulaaccordingto U.S.CognitionofThreatsinNorth-EastAsia

정경두 | 2012, (83) | pp.105~130 | number of Cited : 11

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Theroleofnuclearweapon in theKorean peninsula had been changed bytheU.Snuclearpolicyfor33yearsfrom 1958to1991.Previousstudies on U.S nuclearpolicy on the Korean peninsula were analysis with U.S hegemony and biased critiqueon theU.S.policy.So they had been not enough the objectivity of purpose of nuclear policy on the Korean peninsula.Thispaperisastudyabouttheroleoftacticalnuclearweapons on the Korean peninsula,focusing on the U.S.cognition ofthreats in North-EastAsiaandsecurityofSouthKorea. We could find the change in the role oftacticalnuclearweapons by analyzingthechangeoftheU.S.nuclearpolicy on theKorean peninsula along with U.S. cognition of threats in North-East Asia. U.S. Tactical nuclearweaponshad served forthemilitary purposewhich supplemented the conventionalforces until1960s,and then therole oftacticalnuclear weaponshad changed totheservepoliticalrolebecauseofthechangeof securitysituationinNorth-EastAsiaafter1970s. In the latterhalfof1950s,U.S.adopted the strategy which focus on nuclearforcesto decreasetheburden ofmilitary budgetin South Korea,and improvethemilitaryforcesand securethesafetyin South-EastAsia. So,relativelytheimportanceofconventionalforceswashalved. This trend had resulted in some changes. While Korea army had decreased two divisions in 1958,U.S.army in Korea was reinforced by pentomic divisions and had deployed tacticalunclearweapons as added militaryforcestoconfronttheNorthKorea-Chinacoalitionforces. Atthattime, tacticalunclear weapons in the Korean peninsula had meaningtowhattohaveeconomicalefficiencybyreplacingtacticalnuclear weaponswithconventionalforces,ratherthanitwascausedbythechange ofthreatsin Korean peninsula.Thisconcepthad been theevidencethat tacticalunclearweaponshad had themilitary roleand could beused in war. In 1970s,U.S.nuclear policy on the Korean peninsula were different from theconceptthattacticalnuclearweaponsreplaceconventionalforces becauseNixon Doctrineand SchlesingerDoctrineallowed nuclearweapon's militaryroletodecrease. Improvementin the relationship between U.S. and China caused the change in Chinese threat.U.S.had promoted nuclearpolicy to decrease tacticalnuclear weapons in South Korea and exclude it's military role,eliminating the threat of China and recognizing the only threat of conventionalforces ofNorth Korea to the Korean peninsula.This led to change oftacticalnuclearweapons'doctrine so thatpossibility ofusing tacticalnuclearweapondecreased. In the middle of1970s,U.S.governmenthad searched forpulling the troopsoutoftheKorean peninsula becausethey had believed thatthere was the equilibrium in military forces between North Korea and South Korea.And then they had recognized thatthey had underestimated the threatofNorth Korea and they had canceled thewithdrawalplan.As a result,U.S.army in South Korea had relocated orstored tacticalnuclear weapons in the rear and decreased the number of war-heads and ground-to-groundmissiles. In a word,theroleofU.S.tacticalnuclearweaponshadbeen changed from militarytopolitical.In thelatterhalfof1950s,U.Shadusedtactical nuclear weapons for military purpose to supplementconventionalforces againstthe coalition forces ofChina and North Korea.After1970s,U.S. had changed itsnuclearpolicyemphasizing“Nofirstuse"forthepolitical role,becausetheyhadexcludedthreatofChinainSouth-EastAsia. Inotherwords,U.Shadbelievedthatonlyoneroundoftacticalnuclea weaponscouldtriggerthegeneralnuclearwarandthisbeliefwasreflected on their nuclear policy.They had controlthreatofaround the Korean peninsulabyimprovingrelationshipbetween U.S.andChinaandeasingof tensionswithSovietUnion.Theyhadusedtacticalnuclearweaponsnotas powerfulweaponsinwarbutasthemethodtocontrolthethreat.

A ResearchinWarHistoryontheUseofthe AsymmetricForce

장용운 | 2012, (83) | pp.131~161 | number of Cited : 0

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A Review ontheNatureofGoguryo’sThreeFortresses aroundtheImjinRiverBasin

권순진 | 2012, (83) | pp.163~196 | number of Cited : 5

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A studyontheBenaeFortress(非惱城)Battle – A WarbetweenGungye(弓裔)andYanggil(梁吉)-

Jeong, seong-kwon | 2012, (83) | pp.197~220 | number of Cited : 12

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Thispaperinvestigatesa warbetween Gungyeand Yanggil.They were powerfulclansattheendoftheUnifiedSillaperiod. When Gungye was born into a royalfamily but due to the power struggle,healmostdied.Hespenthischildhood in theTemple.When he grew up,hewentto Gihwon who wasoneofthepowerfulclansatthe Jukju area.Although Gungye joined with his supporters to Gihwon,he didn’ttreatedthem well.Gungyeletdown andayearlaterheleftGihwon and wenta powerfulYanggilclan in Wonju.From this point,Gungye marched on carrying everything before them. Yanggilbecame a strong supporter. In 895,GungyeenteredMyoungju with 600soldiers.A yearlaterheleft Myoungju with 3,500 soldiers.In Myoungju he called himselfa general. From thistime,GungyeandYanggilgotintotrouble. AfterGungye leftMyoungju,his group became bigger.AtlastYanggil began to attack Gungye from 898.Finally,in 890 Gungye and Yanggil armieswerereadytofightadecisivebattle.Thisbattlewasfoughtatthe Benaefortress. Untilrecently therehavebeen many opinionsaboutthelocation ofthe Benae fortress.Recentresearch shows thatthe Benae fortress is Jukju mountainfortress. Thispaperprovesthespecificlocation oftheBenaefortressbattlefield. Accordingtothehistoricalrecord,theBenaefortressbattlewasfoughtout side ofthe Benae fortress.This paper explains thatthe battelfield is Gisolrithatis8km westoftheBenaefortress This paperalso finds thatthe natives strongly supported the Gungye army.The natives ofJukju had strong relationship with Gungye army. ThispapershowsthatsomeoftheGungyearmyGrandfather’shometown was Jukju.This kind ofblood relationship really worked when Goungye armyfoughtwithYanggilarmy. Notonlythesekindofreason butalsoculturalassetsshow thatGisolri was the Benae fortress battle field.In Gisolrithere is a stone Buddha statue.This stone Buddha statue is related to a folktale aboutGungye. Many scholarsagreethatthefolktalesaboutGungyereflectthehistorical facts. This paper presumes that Gisolristone Buddha statue was built in commemoration ofGungye’svictory in theBenaefortressbattle.Afterthe Benaefortressbattle,GungyecouldcontrolthecentralpartoftheKorean peninsula.

TheIssueofSoldierRepatriationandtheMilitary DiplomacybetweenJoseonandMingduringtheEarly JoseonPeriod

KyeoungLok Kim | 2012, (83) | pp.221~258 | number of Cited : 12

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LateGoryeoandearlyJoseon periodwereatimewhen an international tributesystem centered on Yuan wasreplaced by an internationaltribute system centeredon Mingandwith theuncertaintyin thesituation around Lioadung region,therelated parties engaged in fiercemilitary diplomacy. The early Joseon period's military diplomacy was focused on military exchanges and cooperation in order to carry out foreign and military policies by pursuing the diplomatic and military goals of maintaining peacefulrelationship with Ming,military stability in thenorthern frontier andestablishingJoseon'slegitimacyandnationalsecurity. Joseon staged active military diplomacy in order to further national interestand continues tributesystem,which wereinevitableatthetime. Atthattime,Mansan-gun problem,Jurchen problem and othermilitary problemsemergedwiththechangesin internationalsituation.Anextensive Mansan-gunproblemswhichoccurredwhenEmperorYeon’rak. The risk of Joseon-Ming military collision was big, intensifying the captureand ruleofLiaodungbyMing,butin realityitrarelyjeopardized the Joseon-Ming relations.The realmilitary collision in the Joseon-Ming relations was unrealized domestic and foreign situations of the two countries,Byusing diplomacy,thetwocountriessolved theproblem.The military diplomacy between Joseon and Ming was at the heart ofthe disputes.Joseon andMingcooperatemilitarily,repatriaterunawaysoldiers anddriftingsoldiers. Atthattime,theissueofsoldierrepatriation washighly complex and political. In an internationaltribute system centered around Ming, the soldierrepatriations were based upon the premise ofbeomwul(犯越) and wulkyeong(越境).Runaway soldiers were repatriated withoutfail.In this regard Mansan-gun which began during theTaejo period and was atits heightduringtheTaejongperiod,hadtoberepatriatedbutJoseon carried outsuccessfulmilitarydiplomacybymanipulatingthetime,sizeandcause ofthesoldierrepatriations. Keeping an eye on Joseon during the process ofa battle over the ImperialThrone,theMinghadtakenavarietyofmeasurestoeliminatethe diplomatic-military threat. In this process, Joseon made a diplomatic benefit to obtain Gomeong(誥命) from Ming. In legal formality, Ming preventbreakaway from a residentialdistrictand the country,and took firm action againstrunaway soldiers.On this account,Ming recognized thatsoldierrepatriationwasmaindutyofBeongbu(兵部). Joseon dispersed Mansan-gun in allpartsofthecountry and wasnot forthcomingin repatriatingMasan-gun toJoseon madeadiplomaticbenefit to obtain Gomeong(誥命)and theinvestitureofcrown princefrom Ming. Mingdemandpressedfortherepatriation ofJurchen tribes.Respondingto Ming's strong demand, Joseon enforced repatriation. The early Joseon period's concept of soldier repatriation was related to an international tributesystem centered around Ming.Joseon maintained a flexiblesoldier repatriation policy,takingtheinternationalsituation and theJoseon-Ming relationsintoaccount.

NohsaScholarFaction'sAttemptatMilitaryReforms

Kim Bong Gon | 2012, (83) | pp.259~286 | number of Cited : 3

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Honam region,uponenteringthe19thcentury,notunliketherestofthe country was faced with serious corruption within the military administration. The degradation of officialdiscipline and the crumbling caste system led to a great number of people gaining immunity from conscription which resultedin increasedburdensupon thepoortopayoff their conscription duties. Pervasive laxity among military administration officialswasconstantlypointedoutbyroyalundercoveragentsofthetime withdemandsforimprovement. With the Imsulinsurrection in 1862,Nohsa scholarfaction proposed a series of military reform measures. They proposed suggest a realistic re-evaluation of the required military force with the household tax regardless ofstatus and bringing up elite troops,lestmilitary strength shouldweaken.Nohsascholarfaction'smilitaryreform measuresledtoKi JeongJin'sinsistenceon across-the-boardmilitaryreformsdirectedagainst theFrench invasion of1866.KiJungJin stressedthatYang-bansaswell ascommonersshouldbeenlistedandarmedwith bow andarrow. Kialso would havetheheadsofhousehold in each villagelead thevillagersand protect their own districts. In order to counter the fast loading short cannonsoftheWest,Kisuggestedcannonsalongwithbowsandarrowsbe producedatthemilitarycampsitein each provinceanddistributedtothe countydepot.Also,Kiwouldhaveeven civilianscarryweaponsandlearn to use them. This would strengthen the military which then would incorporateinterception tacticsusingtopographicknowledgeoftheregion. KiJeong Jin's county scale defense strategy had been the resultofthe close analysis of the volunteer fighters'actions in the Honam regio againsttheJapaneseinvaders. KiJeongJin'sstrategicplansweretolaytheideologicalgroundwork for KiWu Man,whomusteredthemilitaryforcesoftheNaju areatocounter the Japanese in 1896.This tradition would continue through Ko Gwang Sun and KiSam Yeon,during thelastdaysoftheDaehan Empire,who organized volunteerfightersregardlessofclassand status,whilebringing up professionalsoldiers and artillerymen to engage in guerrilla warfare againsttheoccupyingJapaneseforces.

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military history 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.94

2012, Vol., No.83