2012, Vol., No.82

TheReexaminationoftheGoryeoMaritimeForces sincetheKingGongminin1372

이강욱 | 2012, (82) | pp.1~40 | number of Cited : 7

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This study is focused on the entire process by which the Maritime Forces was reorganized during the late Goryeo Dynasty and is largely dividedintothreesections.Thefirstsection dealswith theorganization of theGoryeo MaritimeForcesand thevariousproblemsitfaced during the Mongol Intervention as well as the background that led to its reorganization. The main discussion in the second section details the reorganizationoftheCentralNavalForces(Haedosugun)inconnectionwith theeffortstoreform theoperationalsystem oftheDynasty’sLand Forces. Thethirdsectionfocusesontheprocessandtheresultoftheeffortstoset up theNavalTen Thousand Units(Sugunmanhobu)amidsttheinvasions ofJapanesepirates(Wokou). ThemaritimeforceoftheGoryeoDynasty,beforeitsreorganization,had belonged to the land force and been largely responsible fortransporting military personnelor supplies. Accordingly, the scope of the activities conductedbythemaritimeforcesinthisperiodwasgravelyrestrictedand,asa result,navalsupremacy waslosttoJapanesepirates.Theresultant increased lossesdueto the pillaging oftax transportation ships and tax storehouses seriously depleted the dynasty’s financialbase.The situation changedpublicopinionfrom an emphasison landdefensetostrengthening maritimecapacity,resultingin thelaunch ofa militarycampaign against the pirates,based on strong navalforces,which took placein the22nd year(1373)ofKingGongmin’srule. TheGoryeo’sCentralNavalForcesin thisperiod wasbased on a dual leadership system headed by the Haedodotongsa and Haedowonsu. The process oforganizing the new system was similar to thatforthe land force,which also had two chiefcommanders,Dotongsa and Wonsu.The reorganization placed the naval force in an equal position with the Dynasty’s Land Forces whereby itcould maintain a parallelrelationship withandactindependentlyofthelatter. The new system,however,failed to cope with enemy invasions in an effectivemannerbecausethescopeofthenavy’sactionswastoowideand theburden on sailorstoohigh.Thissituation ledGoryeo,in the9th year (1383) ofKing U’s rule,to establish the commandership ofHaedowonsu and specialnavalunits(Sugunmanhobu)and to dispatch ofwarshipsto strategicpointsin each province.Thenew navalunitswerepositionedon thedynasty’smajorsea routesforthedefenseofcoastalregionsagainst theJapaneseseamarauders.With thelaunch ofSugunmanhobu,thechief navalcommander(Haedowonsu) began to serve as a navalchiefto the fourprovinces,controlling alloftheregionalnavalforcesofGoryeo.The centralnavalforcesweredivided into two:theLeftGyeonggiNavalUnit and RightGyeonggiNavalUnitwhose duty was to defend the dynasty’s capitalarea.TheChiefsofSugunmanhobu servedasmagistrates(Gammu)in theareastheyweretodefendandthuscontributedtothesafetyofthe coasts via the efforts to increase the manpower at their disposaland ensurethesafetyofordinarypeople. Thereorganization oftheNavalForcesduring thelateGoryeo Dynasty shouldberegardedasthefirstimportantefforttocreateamodernnavyin Korean history.Thesystem establishedin thisperiodwascontinuedinthe followingJoseon Dynasty,which resultedin thegrowth ofthenavalforces in thethreecoastalprovincesin thesouth untilitaccounted for70% of theentiremilitaryforceofthedynasty’ssixsouthernprovinces.

Inthe16thyearofKingSunjo,TheRebellionof Tang-GaeNiandReactionofJoseon

윤호량 | 2012, (82) | pp.41~74 | number of Cited : 16

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RethinkingoftheClausewitz'sVom Kriege:TheExistential WarandRoleofPeopleintheWar

Kim, Tae Hyun | 2012, (82) | pp.75~107 | number of Cited : 6

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TheDevelopmentofGunpowderWeaponand theChangesinCavalryTacticsinthe19thCentury

Choi hyeong guk | 2012, (82) | pp.109~141 | number of Cited : 3

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AStudyontheCharacterofAnseongCountyMagistrate(安城郡守) YunYeong-ryeol(尹英烈)duringtheKoreanEmpire -focusing on hisactivity forthesuppression ofbandits-

이민원 | 2012, (82) | pp.143~178 | number of Cited : 4

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TheOrganizationandOperationsoftheNorthKoreanPeople's ArmyTrainingInstitutionsaftertheLiberationofKoreafrom Japan

김선호 | 2012, (82) | pp.179~210 | number of Cited : 8

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Therewerethreemilitaryinstitutesestablishedin North Koreajustafter theliberation ofKoreafrom Japan:1)PyeongyangAcademy,2)theNorth Korea's Central Constabulary Academy (NKCCA), 3) and the Security OfficerCamp. Pyeongyang Academy, established on January 3, 1946 in Jijang-ri,Jinnampo City,South Pyeongan Provincepriortotheothertwoinstitutes by North Branch ofJoseon CommunistParty,was designed to educate politicalandmilitaryofficersforthenew armedforces.Kim Il-Sungclique was involved in the establishmentand operations ofthe academy.There were two training programs:politicalofficers and military officers atthe beginningoftheacademy.Theprogram forpoliticalofficerswasassigned to theCentralParty's SchoolofNorth Korean CommunistParty,and the otherprogram wastoNKCCA in June1946.Theacademywasreorganized asaninfantrycompanyafterJune1946. TheNKCCA foreducation ofmilitary officersforthenew armed forces was established on July 8, 1946 in Daean-ri, Seongam-myon,Yonggang-gun,South Pyeongan Province.Themajorexecutivemembersof theNKCCA wereKim Il-Sungclique,andSovietUniongroupwasincharge ofprofessionalfields.Korean VolunteerArmy Group gradually weakened. The NKCCA consisted ofinfantry units,signalunits,and artillery units. After October 26, 1947, the NKCCA became a comprehensive military academy.TheSovietarmysetupthecurriculum oftheNKCCA which was the same one as thatofthe SovietMilitary Academy.The NKCCA was founded as an institute for training military officers,and itmaintained theirgoalevenafterthereorganizationinDec.1948. Security Officer Camp (SOC) was established in Gaecheon, South Pyeongan Provincetotrain Boandaeandsecurityguardin earlyJune1946andthen,thefirstbranch inSineuiju,thesecondbranch inJeongju,and thethirdbranch inGanggyewerefollowed.WhileSOC Basicallyreinforced thetroopswith youngmen in North Korea,thefirstandsecondbranches were organized based on the troops who Kang Geon broughtto North Korea.Between September and November in 1946,SOC was reorganized intoan infantrydivision andincluded RailroadGuardin itsdivision.SOC wasreorganizedtotransferthelastguardmission in March 1947.Finally,theSOC wascompletelyswitchedtoaninfantrydivisionofaregulararmy. SOC modeled SovietArmy and SovietArmy’s system fortheireducation philosophy.

TheHistoricalBackgroundandRelatedProblemsof EnactmentofMilitaryCriminalLaw

박안서 | 2012, (82) | pp.211~243 | number of Cited : 7

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A StudyontheMilitaryHistoryabouttheRepublicof Vietnam(SouthVietnam)Collapse

Choi Yong Ho | 2012, (82) | pp.245~274 | number of Cited : 3

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This study is to analyzeaboutlessons learned from Vietnam'sHistory and collapse of the Republic ofVietnam (South Vietnam). This paper consisted ofthreepartssuch asthehistoryandwaroftheVietnam,the reasonsaboutcollapseoftheSouth Vietnam,and issuesrising from the SocialistRepublicofVietnam.Especially,analysisofthedatawastriedto objectiveanalysisbased on historicalfactsoftheVietnam.Theresultsof thisstudyareasthefollowings. First, history about Vietnam is giving many lessons to the Korean Peninsula. Korea and Vietnam are positioned in the similar geo-politic location.HistoricallessonsaboutVietnam couldbeunderstoodthrough the studyonnationaltitlesofVietnam.Accordingly,itisneededtostudymore deeply on the classification ofdifferences aboutthe South Vietnam,the RepublicofVietnam,theSocialistRepublicofVietnam,Vietminh,and so on,andcontentsrelatednamesofthenationandwars. Second,thereasonsofoccupyingtheSouth Vietnam bythecommunists couldbesummarizedasthefourelementswhich arethecorruption ofher governmentand leaders,theegoism ofherpeoples,theidleand decayof hermilitary forces,and the wrong strategies ofthe United States (US). Thosefourelementsofreasonsmentioned abovesentencewereinteracted and escalated among others.Consequently,the South Vietnam felldown finally even though positive supports from democratic freedom countries suchastheUS,andsoon. Third,theSocialistRepublicofVietnam disregard thePeace Treaty as the wastepaper,occupied South Vietnam,and won in thewars against CambodiaandChina.Nevertheless,militaryvictoryoftheSocialistRepublic ofVietnam hindered hernationaldevelopment,andgavecausesthatthe countryfelldown astheoneofpoorestcountryin theworld.Andso,the Vietnam should havetried changeofhereconomicsystem called DoiMoi policywhichmeansthecapitalsystem. TheColdWarSystem builtaftertheSecondWorldWar,iscloselyrelated with theVietnam War(1955∼1975)and theKorean War(1950∼1953).In thefuture,thewarsintheEastAsiawillbeaffectedmorebythedynamic internationalrelationshipthaninternalproblemsofothertribes. Recently,four superpower countries around the Korean Peninsula are competingamongothersaswellasopposingtheRepublicofKorea(ROK)with North Korea each other.IftheROK leadersand Korean peopleswill begoforward smoothly on thesurging tidesofgeo-politics,theyneed to acceptpreciselythelessonslearnedfrom theVietnam. Especially North Korean leaderswereurged to acceptthemodelofthe Vietnam'sreform andopeningassoonaspossibleafterdeepconsiderations about the lessons learned from the Vietnam which was blocked the nationaldevelopment.

USArmsTransferPolicies'ApplicationofKorea -EquipmentTransferbasedonCarter'sWithdrawalPlanof USForcesinKorea(1977∼1978)-

UM JUNGSIK | 2012, (82) | pp.275~303 | number of Cited : 2

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President Carter had moralconvictions thatarms transfer should be restrained forworld peace.Asa result,CarterAdministration established arms transferrestraintpolicies,so ithard to avoid a conflictwith the RepublicofKorea(ROK)asan alliance.Moreover,armstransferrestraint policiescould beclashed with withdrawalplan oftheUnited States(US)Forces in Korea which was parts ofpolicy toward the ROK.Ifso,how could CarterAdministration apply arms transferrestraintpolicies to the ROK intheconflictbetween theROK andwithdrawalplan ofUSForcesin Korea.Didn’tCarterAdministrationapplyarmstransferrestraintpoliciesto theROK? Ordid CarterAdministration restrain equipmenttransfertoward theROK?Thisarticleanalyzed thesequestionsbasedon recentfirst-hand documentsthatIhadcollectedthroughfieldworksintheUS. Asa result,CarterAdministration’sequipmenttransfertoward theROK was nota naturalcomplementary measure butan application ofarms transfer restraint policies as a global policy of Carter Administration. Concretely, Carter Administration emphasized arms transfer restraint policiesforgiving equipmenttransferto theROK and forrestraining the ROK’soffensiveabilityandregionalarmsracesduringreceiptthesanction ofcongress.Although Park Jung-hee Administration had a dissatisfaction with PD-13 butdid notwantto clash with the US because they had acceptedwith apriorityofmilitaryassistancetowardtheROK.Application of arms transfer restraint policies for equipment transfer to the ROK showed thatPresidentCarter’s moralprinciple had been realized atthe part of policies toward the ROK until 1978. At the same time, this phenomenon showedthatrestrainingKorean Peninsula’sarmsraceswould correspond with Congress’interests.There is significance ofanalyzing a linkage which had been notfocused atthe study ofCold Warbetween globalstrategiesandpoliciestowardtheROK inthisarticle.

A StudyontheChina'sWarDecisionFactors -FocusingontheChina-Vietnam War-

권준문 | 2012, (82) | pp.305~330 | number of Cited : 2

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Throughouthistory,wars between emerging powerfulnations and the originaloneshavebroughta changein theinternationalorder.Struggles among European powers such as Espana,Netherlands,England between 16th and18th centuriessupportsitwell.Each countrieshadcompetedfor powerand foughtmany wars.In such perspective,China'srisein power willbethereason forChinatomaintain itsown orderthrough expanding military,whichisthesymbolforpower,andsuch action willfurtheraffect theinternationalorderandEastAsiaregioninnegativeways.Thus,strong power is needed in order to assign China the bigger responsibility and commitment. Moreover, China is expanding its military to prepare for diversifiednew threatsandpossiblewarandtoprofitforitssurvival.Such future China willmore likely to become a majorthreatto its neighbor countriesratherthanacontributiontocommonprosperity. The research has utilized Waltz's three images to analyze China's war decision in caseoftheChina-Vietnam War.In otherwords,threeelements calledindividual,nation,internationalstructureexplainwhyChinadeclared warupon Vietnam atthetime.Therearethreereasonswhich causedthe war:awarenessofChina'sleaderslikeDeungShaoPing in an individual scale, change in China's strategy in a nationalscale, and change in internationalorder First reason is the awareness of China's political leaders. This is differentfrom the Western conceptoffairamong countries.Analyze how china recognized other countries and how this caused China to declare war.ThatistosayChina'spoliticalleaders',includingDeong ShaoPing,historicalawareness ofcolonized Vietnam and geopoliticalawareness of EastAsiagreatlyaffectedChina'sactionforwar. Secondreason isthechangein China'sstrategy.AfterDeon ShaoPing's rein,therewas a change in termsofitsmilitary and economy.China's military,changedfrom Communistswarfarestrategytomodern Communist warfare strategy,stressed more on offense,so the new conceptofwar strategy affected the war execution procedure. And in order to secure assets and skills needed for its economic growth, China realized the importanceofChineseresidentabroad.Vietnam'soppression policy,which wasagainsttheChinesepolicy,convincedChinaforitswar. Third reason isthechangein localinternationalorder.In otherwords,Vietnam'saction in breaking away from China and in allyingwith Soviet Union heightened the tension for war.Vietnam's oppression on Chinese residents and Cambodian's military invasion worsened the relationship between China and Vietnam. As the complications occurred, Vietnam moved toward more Soviet-friendly policy.As a result,China decided to wage war when it understood Vietnam-Soviet relations as a threat in China'ssecurity. In conclusion, analyzing China's decision factors before the China-Vietnam War can be used to understand strategy ofpowerfulcountries around China.IfChina's three factors,as mentioned above,areused to analyzeChina'sfuturerise,whetherChinausesitsmilitarypowerforthe sakeofitssurvivalandsecurity. Once again, through out the research on China's war determination factors,we can prospectthatwhich theory remains in the relation with adjacentnationsamongChinathreattheoryandpeacedevelopmenttheory

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military history 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.94

2012, Vol., No.82