2012, Vol., No.85

Goguryeo’sOccupationoftheSouthandCavalryBattles -FocusingontheOccupationoftheMouthofGanghwaBay-

Yi Hong Du | 2012, (85) | pp.1~27 | number of Cited : 5

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TheImjin Riverand theHan Rivermergesattheestuary oftheHan River,which in turn mergeswith themouth oftheYeseongRivertoform theGanghwaBay.KingGoisubjugatedthe8nationsofJinhan,asubject provinceofDaebangGun,andhencepreoccupiedandcontroledthemouth ofGanghwaBay.When KingMicheondroveoutNakrangGunin A.D.313,the two nations,Goguryeo and Baekje,were shared borderand thewar wasinevitable. In 369, King Gogukwon invaded Chiyang (Baecheon‐gun) in Baekje with 20thousandinfantryandcavalrytroops.TheCrown PrinceGeungusu led hiscavalry through a byway toarriveatChiyang,and pitched camp on Bangeolyang (Baecheon‐gun) opposite Chiyang. He ambushed his soldiers,andlaunchedasurpriseattack on theelitetroopsoftheredflag by means ofcavalry. Winning the war, Baekje secured FortSugok in Singye Province atthe upperRiverofYeseong.In 371,the two nations wereagain engaged atPaeha.Baekjewon the warby a surpriseattack with its cavalry,and hence extended its westboundary to the Ungjin PeninsulaandHaeju.Inthewinterofthesameyear,KingGeunchogowith hisCrown PrinceattackedPyeongyangFort(theDaedongRiver)andwon. The reason why Baekje won allthree battles was thatithad excellent cavalrytacticswithmobility. King Gwanggaeto won allfive wars with Baekje. The victories were basedon thebuildingaheavilyarmedandequippedcorps.InOctober391,KingGwanggaetotook GwanmiFortatthemouth ofGanghwaBaybyan amphibiousoperation.Atthattime,Goguryeo’scavalryblockedthelogistic linein thenearofBaekje’snavalforces.With thefallofGwanmiFort,Baekje lost the maritime outpost. On the other hand, King Asin was defeated withoutovercoming King Gwanggaeto’s cavalry troops though he stakedthefateofhisnationon thereclamationofGwanmiFort.Then,he abstained from theattack on the mouth ofGanghwa Bay,butadvanced into Sugok Fortin Singye.In 393,King Asin pitched camp in frontof Sugok Fort.King Gwanggaetomanned 5thousand cavalrymen in thevan and on theleftand rightsides,and heputspearand shield soldiersat theback oftheheavily armed and equipped corps.Baekjestood against Goguryeo by disposing shield solders in the van. However, when the centralfilecollapsed,theycouldn’thelpbutwithdrawing.InJuly394,King Asin tried a pay‐offatthePaesu.AsKing Gwanggaetoattacked with 7thousand cavalrymen, Baekje army ran away. King Gawnggaeto turned light cavalry troops to the rear area to attack the Baekje army and inflicted8thousandcasualties. King Jangsu aggressively drove the policy ofadvancing southward.In 475,thekingled30thousandsoldierson hisown tosiegeHanseongwith fourunits.He burntthe northern gate by fire attack,entered and took Hanseong with King Gaero killed.He came back to Pyeongyang evading battles with Baekje corps staying north of the Han River. Then, the cavalryprotectedtheking’sarmyinthenear.

TheaspectandinfluenceoftheBattleinAmakseon

Hur,Jung-Gweon , Jung, Duk-gi | 2012, (85) | pp.29~60 | number of Cited : 15

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TheBattleofIlmosanseongbyWangGeonandGongjik’sRol

Kim, Myeongjin | 2012, (85) | pp.61~88 | number of Cited : 10

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TheNavalEmploymentof Korea(Chosun),Japan,and China(Ming)duringtheImjinWar

장학근 | 2012, (85) | pp.89~126 | number of Cited : 5

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TraditionalKorean navalsystem was established to preventJapanese pirate.AsJapanesepirates’activitieshad increased,theChosun kingdom haddeployedsailorsandwarshipsin portsalongthecoastlineandislands to repelinvading Japanese pirates from the sea.And they divided sea areasintoseveralseasectorstodefendeachsectorbythemselves. Forthepurposeofseadefense,navalforceshadbeen developingflotilla organization, command and communication, maneuvering tactics, and constructed flat-house-type warships with the biggerhulland the higher freeboard than the Japanese warships in order to neutralize Japanese boardingtactics. ThetraditionalJapanesenavywasoriginatedfrom japanesepiratesand its army.Both Japanese pirate and army used similartactics,since its navyusedtofighttogetherwiththearmyduringtheircivilwar. Hideyosi had a ambition to conquer the world, ie the whole Asia including China and India. Neither he had strong warships nor naval capabilitiestodefeatChinesenavy.Asaresult,hehadnoplan fornaval battletoinvadeKoreanpeninsular. At that time, Korean court was preoccupied with the concept that “Japanese are strong in naval battle because they are islander" and “Koreans are strong in ground battle because themselves are continental people". The Korean court expected land battle and ordered naval commanderstofighton land. ThismeasureallowedJapaneseamphibious landing and resulted in serious consequence.As Chosun gave up naval battle, the Japanese landing forces invaded and overpowered defending forcesoccupiedthecapitalwithinfifteendays. Frightened and land-oriented King Sunjoasked AdmiralYiSun-sin and Won gyun to interdict Japanese forces supply line (sea line of communication).FortunatelyAdmiralYiandWon'scombinedfleetwon the naval battles continuously. So the Japanese forces had to withdraw southwardandtookdefensiveposturetobeginpeacetalks. Japaneseforcesinvadedagain afterthefailureoftrucetalks.Thistime their objective was Jeollado farming area and Korean navy. Japanese learned lessons from the previous mistakes and manuplated to setup admiralYiSun-sin.WhenAdmiralYiwasrelievedfrom thecommand,they induced Korean fleetto Busan port and destroyed itatChilchunryang strait. The Chosun courtreinstated AdmiralYiSun-sin as the commanding officerofthecombinedfleet.Again,thecourtorderedlandbattletoKorean navy sincethereremained only twelvewarships.ButAdmiralYistrongly suggested to fightatsea becauseheknew itwould be thebestway to savehiscountry.Hewon theMyungryangseabattleandmadeaglorious navalhistory. After the dramatic victory,he builtnew navalbase for combined fleetatGogumdo,and endeavored to block Japanesefleetfrom escaping. Japanese general Gonisi lost ways to escape by passing through blockadeline,hetried to withdraw from thepeninsularwhileconducting defensive operations. When Japanese strongman Hideyosi died, Gonisi bribed ChineseadmiralJin Rin.Chinesemilitary strategywastoend the warwithoutbattle,butKoreans were ready to die forrevenge.In that situation,a Japanese spy boatran away due to negligence ofChinese navy.AdmiralYiSun-sin prepared forfinalsea battleand began tosail with battle formation.He decided to attack firstapproaching Simazfleet from the sea,then to block the fleeing Gonisifleetlater.AsAdmiralYi departed the port to move to Noryang, the Chinese fleet followed to support.Navalbattlebegan when Simazfleetapproached Noryang strait,As Korean-Chinese combined fleetsecure victory,AdmiralYiSun-in was shotand dead.Theremainingcrushed Japanesefleetran awaytoBusan andbacktoJapan.FinallysevenyearsofImjinwarwasover.

JapaneseForces'DefenseSystem & FortressinBusan duringtheJapaneseColonialperiod

kim yun mi | 2012, (85) | pp.127~162 | number of Cited : 11

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TherestillexistsomemilitaryremainsbuiltduringtheJapanesecolonial period in Busan,such as the Japanesemilitary postatGadeok-do,and Jangjadeung artillery unitatYongho-dong,etc.This is to look into the changes and processes offortress construction in Busan from the 1900s untilthe1940s. It was at the beginning of the construction of their stronghold at Gadeok-do in preparation for the 1904 Russo-Japanese War thatJapan perceivedBusanastheirpropermilitaryfoothold.Sincethen,Japansetup theJinhaeBayareaincludingGadeok-doandGeoje-doin December,1907. Jinhae Bay was incorporated into the Japanese navy zone while the Japanese army planned the fortress construction by binding Jinhae-Tusushima-Sasebo together through the setup of ‘Joseon Straits System.’It was after World War One and the Washington Conference on DisarmamentthatBusan was completely included as a fortified zone.In 1922,construction of‘Joseon StraitsFortified System'wasplanned asthe oneforthesea,landandairdefense. In 1924,Jinhae fortress was setup with Jinhae Bay as Zone 1 and Busan asZone2.Such a seriesofstrategieswereaimed atpreparing a defenseshieldwhichwouldmakeimpossibletheaccessoftheenemyfleet. However, Japan made arrangements for the defense against the command of the sea in some degree, whereas preparations for the commandoftheairwasslight. They commented on the importance ofthe antiaircraftdefense in th 1920s,butitwasn'tuntilthelate1930sthattheairdefensestrategywas putintoamilitaryoperation. Immediately after the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Japanese governmentissued an orderof‘CombatReadinessfortheAirDefense'to the fortress ofJinhae Bay,and expanded Jinhae Bay in October.They organizedanew artilleryunitatGijang,Young-do,andGeoje-doincluding theJangjadeugartilleryunit.In 1940,whileputtingthemostemphasison the airdefense,they planned to establish ‘Busan Fortified Headquarters',andswitcheditsnameto‘BusanFortifiedHeadquarters'afterrelocatingthe Jinhae Fortified Headquarters to Busan. However, such air defense installationsfailedtodefendthemselvesagainsttheUSB-29airraidwhich kickedintohighgearin1944. TheJapaneseforcesswitched tostraitsblockadeforcontrolofthesea from securingsearoutesofvesselswhileswitchingtocontroloftheairfor thedefenseagainstabomber,oran air-defense-centered system from the defense againsta submarine.As Busan was gradually expanded in its scope ofa military zone,artillery units had to be deployed atthe key areasinBusan.

MacArthur'sStandpointoftheInternationalMilitary TribunalFarEastandtheoriginsofRefractionof KoreaJapanRelationsafterWorldWarⅡ

Sangho Lee | 2012, (85) | pp.163~190 | number of Cited : 0

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A StudyontheCauseofFailureDeterrenceandNorth Koreas'InvasionintheKoreanWar -FocusedonNorthandSouthKoreas'MilitaryStrategies beforetheKoreanWar(1948to1950)-

김대성 | 2012, (85) | pp.191~221 | number of Cited : 1

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Sofar,causesoftheKorean Warhavebeenmainlyinvestigatedboth in the internationalpolitics and domestic politics. On the otherhand,the aspects ofmilitary strategies been researched. As CarlVon Clausewitz said,‘Warisa politicalmeans',causesofwarshould bediscussed with politicalmotives,butmilitarystrategicaspectsareveryimportantaswell. Itisdifficultforacountrytostartawarwithoutexpecting‘possibilityof victory',nomatterhow attractiveapoliticalmotiveseems. Possibility of victory can be calculated through both sides'military strategies.Therefore,thisstudyaimstoinvestigatethereasonswhySouth KoreafailedtodeterNorthKorea'sinvasionfrom theperspectiveofmilitary strategy. Thus, this study examines both the attacker’s and defender's military strategicadvantagesand disadvantagesaswellasthecorrelation between militarystrategiesandwardeterrence.Basedon thefindings,this study investigatesthetwoKoreas'military buildup and military strategies before the Korean War,furtheranalyzing the reasons why South Korea failedtorepelNorthKorea'sinvasionfrom thepointofmilitarystrategy. When it comes to North Korea's military buildup and invasion plan between 1948 and 1950, North Korea had clear political and military objectives called ‘Unification underCommunism'and adopted a blitzkrieg strategy to attain its objectives in the shortestperiod,and its military buildupwasgoodenoughtoexecuteitsblitzkriegstrategy. When it comes to South Korea's military buildup and defense plan,however,South Korea failed to establish an exactdirection between its politicaland militaryobjectives,which could bethedefenseagainstNorth Korea'sinvasion and restoration ofNorth Korean territoryand even failed toestablish adefenseplanbasedon anattrition strategywhich waslikely to cope with North Korea's blitzkrieg strategy mosteffectively.Moreover,South Korea didn't properly pursue military buildup because ofseveral restrictions. In conclusion,North Korea's possibility ofvictory became considerably higherfrom thepointofmilitarystrategyin theearly1950s,which ledto acircumstancethatSouthKoreacouldn'tdeterNorthKorea'sinvasionfrom amilitarystrategicpointofview aswellasfrom theinternationalpolitical pointofview.

A StudyontheManagementandUseofCaptured MaterialsbytheROK ArmyduringtheKoreanWar

윤인수 | 2012, (85) | pp.223~246 | number of Cited : 1

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During the Korean War,the ROK army captured materials ofvarious forms from the North Korean army and Chinese volunteer army.Their majorcapturedmeterialwasweaponry.Mostofthefirearmstheycaptured wereSovietM-1891,M-1944,and PPSH-41,and mostofthevehiclesthey capturedwereSovietGaz-67lightutilityvehicles,Gaz,andZisvehicles.In addition,they also captured grains,ginseng steamed red,raw silk,and copperplateata gold smelting factory,which reflectthegreatvariety of thecapturedmaterials However, it seems that they had no systematic management or guidelines forcaptured materials in the beginning.Article 31 ofNational Defense Act(國防警備法) which was enacted in 1948 and used as the military law till1961,had provisions aboutpunishments for those who illegally disposed ofcaptured materials.As forweaponry,the ones in a good condition seem to have been included in the firearms ofthe ROK army and used by them on the field withoutparticular registration or managementprocedures.Italsoseemsthattheunitsthatcaptured other types of captured materials frequently disposed of or sold them at discretion. In such a situation, President Syngman Rhee ordered the MinistryofHomeAffairs,thepolice,and therightwingtosuperviseand manage captured materials in October, 1950. The Ministry of National DefensetookovertheresponsibilityinMarch,1951. Captured materials were used in many differentways,whose specific patternswereasfollows:first,thefirearmswerehandedovertothepolice and prison guards in the rearand used in activities to maintain publi peacein therear.ThecapturedSovietpistolswereusedforself-protection by major figures. The captured vehicles possessed by the military or repaired and used bycivilianswerealldisposed ofin October,1956after theArmisticeAgreement.Somecaptured materialswereon displayforthe general public to see in the rear for propaganda purposes. Finally,captured materialsthatwerepeculiarorverysymbolicweregiven toU.S. militaryleadersasgifts.

TheAnalysisontheDecisiveFactorsoftheStrategyforthe CommunistChinatoEndtheWarduringtheKoreanWar

최북진 | 2012, (85) | pp.247~292 | number of Cited : 1

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Thisarticleaimstoanalyzethedecisivefactorsofthestrategy to end thewarfortheCommunistChinaduringtheKoreanWar(1950-1953). The Korean War was the most difficult and potentially the most disastrousoftheearlyCold Warperiod,a conflictwhich directlyinvolved one ofsuperpowers in open war with the mostpopulous state in the world.The othersuperpowerwas only indirectly involved butthere was always the possibility thatitmightintervene; a third world war could erupt. TheChineseCommunistForces(CCF)had entered warin Korea in late October1950,completely surprising theRepublicofKorea aswellasthe United NationsCommand.TheCommunistChina entered theKorean war to help North Korea and to resisttheUnited StatesofAmerica.And the CommunistChina had foughtthe UN Forces and Korean forces until27July1953. This study hastried to answerthe following key questions:(1)What wastheconceptandthedecisivefactorsof‘thestrategytoendthewar(終結戰略)’duringtheKorean War?(2)How didtheCommunistChinaactin the initialstage and afterthe North Korea's surprise attack againstthe South Korea? (3)Why did theCommunistChina entertheKorean War?(4)WhatwaswarpolicyandobjectiveoftheCommunistChinaduringthe Korean War? (5)When andWhydid theCommunistChina trytochange hiswarobjectiveand waraim? (6)Why did theSovietUnion and North Korea involvetheCommunistChina into theKorean War? (7)Whatwas the role ofthe CommunistChina as a wartime lead state during thKorean War?(8)Whatdid theCommunistChina obtain from theSoviet UnionandtheNorthKoreaduringtheKoreanWarandafterthearmistice?In seeking answers to the above questions this paper used the CommunistChina’sdocumentsandmaterials,theSovietUnions’documents and materials,and documentsand filesoftheKorea Government,Korean WarHistory ofMinistry ofNationalDefenseofROK,and theMemoirsof thosestatesman andgeneralswhoplayed an activepartin policy-making wereconsulted. In conclusion, the Communist China achieved an enforcement and modernization of the Chinese Communist Forces, and enforced their Sino-Soviet Union alliance relations through the Korean War. The CommunistChina also broughtchange in Sino-North Korea relationship,which meant the rule of North Korea by the Communist China. Accordingly,theCommunistChina becameoneoftheleadingstateswith theAmericaandtheSovietUnionaftertheKoreanWar.

<ABSTRACT> TheProcessAnalysisfortheNormalizationof Soviet-JapaneseTies:A StudyontheTerritorialIssue

CHOI TAI-KANG | 2012, (85) | pp.293~322 | number of Cited : 2

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2012, Vol., No.85